Palestinians’ Statehood Is Not Guaranteed
In the last few months of 2024, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted two Resolutions intended to speed up the establishment of a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the so-called West Bank.
These UN resolutions, partly based on the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in July 2024, seek to compel Israel to withdraw its military and civilian presence from the ‘Occupied Palestinian Territory’ and to establish a Palestinian state swiftly. In its Advisory Opinion, the ICJ argued that Israel’s ‘presence’ (ie. the existence of Israeli civilians and soldiers) in the so-called ‘occupied territories’ has become illegal. In the subsequent resolutions, the majority of the UNGA members call on all member states to support these demands by applying pressure on Israel through legal, diplomatic and economic measures.
Resolution ES-10/24 (September 2024) demands Israel’s unconditional withdrawal from East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza within 12 months, disregarding Israel’s legitimate sovereign claims and past agreements like the Oslo Accords and UNSC Resolution 242 (1967). If implemented, it could create a security vacuum in the West Bank and Gaza threatening Israel’s very existence.
By its part, Resolution A/79 L/23 (November 2024) calls for a high-level international conference in June 2025, endorsing the paradigm of the two-state solution. The resolution, however, emphasises compliance with the Oslo Accords and UNSC Resolution 242. Unlike ES- 10/24, it avoids imposing deadlines and unilateral demands, promoting more inclusive diplomacy.
These resolutions are highly problematic and should be rejected. They ignore (i) the massive problem of extreme Islamist terrorism—not only for Israel but for regional and global stability—and (ii) the risks associated with a hasty Israeli withdrawal from these territories and implementation of the two-state solution.
Of course, neither the ICJ Advisory Opinion nor the UNGA resolutions are legally binding on Israel or any other state. But they do have a significant political impact. And the adoption of such resolutions over time can affect the development of customary international law. (There are basically two main sources of public international law: customary law and treaty— otherwise known as ‘conventional’ law. Customary law consists of those rules that states develop over time through their conduct reflecting their acceptance of rules as universal and binding. UN General Assembly resolutions do not make law, but if a series of resolutions is adopted by almost all states over time,
this can be used as evidence of the development of customary law. It must be emphasised that UNGA resolutions concerning Israel are almost always adopted by a bare majority of states, and thus do not constitute evidence of the existence of customary law.)
Despite the fall of its key ally Assad in Syria, Iran remains a major security threat to Israel, continuing to fund and arm Hamas and its proxies including Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. In the meantime, jihadist groups like ISIS and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) have gained strength in Syria.
Turkey’s growing involvement, particularly its support for the Syrian National Army (SNA) and other factions targeting the Kurds, has intensified these challenges. Ankara’s actions, often driven by neo-Ottoman ambitions, heighten tensions and could potentially lead to armed conflict between Israel and Turkey in the future.
Palestinian governance remains a critical security risk for Israel. The Palestinian Authority (PA) continues to struggle with corruption and inefficiency, and its weakness and inaction were significant factors leading to Hamas’s attack on Israel on 7 October. Trust between the parties is now at an all-time low, complicating—if not entirely undermining—the possibility of re-engaging with the two-state formula.
In this fragile context, a very recent provisional ceasefire between Hamas and Israel in Gaza—brokered by Qatar and endorsed by US President Donald Trump—has temporarily halted hostilities and enabled the release of the first round of Israeli hostages.
However, this provides only a brief respite and raises questions about its durability and the long-term prospects for stability.
To address postwar Gaza’s security and governance challenges, we propose the establishment of an international peacekeeping force led by Israel and supported by Arab nations, including signatories of the Abraham Accords, Saudi Arabia, and other peace- supporting countries from regions such as Latin America and Africa. This initiative could be followed by a modern trusteeship to oversee governance, reconstruction, and development, ensuring sustained peace.
We also recommend the creation of an arbitration mechanism to provide compensation for refugees (or their descendants) who fled their homes in 1949. This would include Palestinians who left the territories of the State of Israel around that time due to actual or perceived violence, and Jews who were displaced from Arab states and the territories of Mandate Palestine seized by Jordan—aligned with UNSC Resolution 242’s call for a ‘just settlement of the refugee problem.’
Moreover, in our view, UN member states should:
- Prioritise neutralising internationally sponsored terrorism and jihadist threats over immediate Palestinian statehood demands;
- Leverage Resolution A/79 L/23 to encourage pragmatic diplomacy and direct negotiations between Israel and the PLO as required by the Oslo Accords and UNSC Resolution 242;
- Ensure Palestinian governance is reformed as a condition of acknowledging Palestinian rights to establish a state; and
- Recognise Israel’s sovereignty over East Jerusalem, and its sovereignty claims and right to maintain control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip until secure
borders are negotiated.
